Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1423670
DOI10.1007/s001820000046zbMath1062.91024OpenAlexW2063821932MaRDI QIDQ1423670
Publication date: 7 March 2004
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000046
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (15)
Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations ⋮ Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations ⋮ Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money ⋮ Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods ⋮ House allocation with transfers ⋮ Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
This page was built for publication: Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
