Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1423684
DOI10.1007/s001820300156zbMath1063.91065OpenAlexW2045439295MaRDI QIDQ1423684
Publication date: 7 March 2004
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300156
Related Items (14)
On the stability of couples ⋮ Constrained school choice ⋮ Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory ⋮ Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ A further note on the college admission game ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability ⋮ Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability ⋮ Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter
This page was built for publication: Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
