The probability of conflicts in a U. S. presidential type election

DOI10.1007/s00199-003-0375-2zbMath1128.91316OpenAlexW2055945765MaRDI QIDQ1424208

Vincent R. Merlin, Dominique Lepelley, Jean Louis Rouet, Rainer Feix

Publication date: 11 March 2004

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0375-2

zbMATH Keywords

ParadoxVotingProbability.US presidential election

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (13)

Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union ⋮ The probability of majority inversion in a two-stage voting system with three states ⋮ Asymptotic probability of majority inversion under a general binomial voting model ⋮ Multi-dimensional rules ⋮ The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system ⋮ Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations ⋮ Gerrymander-proof representative democracies ⋮ Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis ⋮ The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes ⋮ Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox ⋮ Voting power: an information theory approach ⋮ On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules ⋮ A kinetic approach to the study of opinion formation

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