The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
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Publication:1424228
DOI10.1007/s00199-003-0380-5zbMath1084.91016OpenAlexW1974560704MaRDI QIDQ1424228
Publication date: 11 March 2004
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0380-5
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships ⋮ Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining ⋮ No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining ⋮ Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
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