Aggregation of utility and social choice: a topological characterization.

DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2003.08.003zbMath1062.91023OpenAlexW2095769008MaRDI QIDQ1427269

D. Massart

Publication date: 14 March 2004

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2003.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

Cardinal preferenceImpossibility theoremIndifference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Binary choice, subset choice, random utility, and ranking: a unified perspective using the permutahedron ⋮ Null preference and the resolution of the topological social choice paradox ⋮ Social evaluation functionals with an arbitrary set of alternatives ⋮ Is a continuous rational social aggregation impossible on continuum spaces?

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On the robustness of the impossibility result in the topological approach to social choice
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
• Harsanyi's aggregation theorem without selfish preferences
• Social choice theory in the case of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
• Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
• The topological equivalence of the Pareto condition and the existence of a dictator
• A selective review of recent characterizations of stochastic choice models using distribution and functional equation techniques
• Topological and discrete social choice: in a search of a theory
• Topological social choice
• Actions of symmetry groups
• On isotopic dictators and homological manipulators
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities and Cardinal Preferences
• Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity
• Aggregation Procedure for Cardinal Preferences: A Formulation and Proof of Samuelson's Impossibility Conjecture
• Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
• Pontryagin Duality in K-Theory