Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00123-6zbMath1063.91022OpenAlexW2078398922MaRDI QIDQ1427486

D. Massart

Publication date: 14 March 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00123-6

zbMATH Keywords

CournotCoalition-proofnessCompetition via supply functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

On the equivalence of quantity competition and supply function competition with sunk costs ⋮ Strategic incentives for keeping one set of books under the arm's length principle ⋮ Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: An application to the Spanish electricity market ⋮ Coalition-proof supply function equilibria under capacity constraints ⋮ Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome ⋮ Price-quantity competition with varying toughness

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
• On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets with Large Fixed Costs
• On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty

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