Local coordination and market equilibria.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00105-4zbMath1063.91002MaRDI QIDQ1427487

Sayantan Ghosal, Shurojit Chatterji

Publication date: 14 March 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

CoordinationStabilityRationalizabilityMarkets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets ⋮ Decentralizability of efficient allocations with heterogeneous forecasts ⋮ Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players ⋮ Learning competitive equilibrium ⋮ Functional rational expectations equilibria in market games ⋮ Optimal substructure of set-valued solutions of normal-form games and coordination

Cites Work

• The limit points of monopolistic competition
• The non-cooperative equilibria of a trading economy with complete markets and consistent prices
• Rationalizability, strong rationality, and expectational stability
• Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: Two models
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Market Uncertainty: Correlated and Sunspot Equilibria in Imperfectly Competitive Economies
• Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Local coordination and market equilibria.