Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00125-XzbMath1062.91031OpenAlexW1978696551MaRDI QIDQ1427488

Mark Walker, Jason M. Shachat

Publication date: 14 March 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00125-x

zbMATH Keywords

Heterogeneity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games

Cites Work

• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
• Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games
• Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Fictitious play: A statistical study of multiple economic experiments
• Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play