Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
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Publication:1427493
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00107-8zbMath1063.91064OpenAlexW1987932026MaRDI QIDQ1427493
Publication date: 14 March 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00107-8
Related Items (5)
Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets ⋮ An impossibility theorem for matching problems ⋮ Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power
Cites Work
- A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- On cores and indivisibility
- The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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