Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00107-8zbMath1063.91064OpenAlexW1987932026MaRDI QIDQ1427493

Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 14 March 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00107-8

zbMATH Keywords

ImplementationMonotonicityStrong core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Social choice (91B14) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (5)

Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets ⋮ An impossibility theorem for matching problems ⋮ Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power

Cites Work

• A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
• Implementation in generalized matching problems
• Games of manipulation in marriage problems
• On cores and indivisibility
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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