Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00133-9zbMath1063.91006OpenAlexW2082549110MaRDI QIDQ1427494

Shlomo Weber, Ori Haimanko, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 14 March 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00133-9

zbMATH Keywords

PartitionsCoreConfigurationsEfficiencySustainabilityPersonalized costsPublic projects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (7)

The stability threshold and two facets of polarization ⋮ Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core ⋮ Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of theHeiseimunicipal amalgamations ⋮ Rawlsian pricing of access to public facilities: a unidimensional illustration ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules ⋮ ``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting

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