Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games.

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00879-2zbMath1043.91006OpenAlexW3021305263MaRDI QIDQ1427596

Dinko Dimitrov, S. H. Tijs, Rodica Branzei

Publication date: 14 March 2004

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(02)00879-2

zbMATH Keywords

Weber setGame theoryCoreHypercubesCooperative gamesFuzzy coalitionsCompromise values of \(\sigma\)-type and of \(\tau\)-typeFuzzy gamesPath solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Fuzzy and other nonstochastic uncertainty mathematical programming (90C70)

Related Items (8)

Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: two sides of one coin ⋮ The equal allocation of nonseparable costs: an extension under fuzzy behavior ⋮ A consistent allocation and related results under fuzzy transferable-utility behavior1 ⋮ A note on the core: minimal conversely consistent enlargement ⋮ A fast approach to compute fuzzy values of matrix games with payoffs of triangular fuzzy numbers ⋮ Various characterizations of convex fuzzy games ⋮ Profit allocation among rational players in a cooperative game under uncertainty ⋮ Convex interval games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The \(\tau\)-value, the core and semiconvex games
• An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value
• Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game
• Fuzzy games: A description of the concept
• The equalizer and the lexicographical solutions for cooperative fuzzy games: Characterization and properties
• Compromise values in cooperative game theory
• A lexicographical solution concept in an \(n\)-person cooperative fuzzy game
• The apex power measure for directed networks
• Notes on a new compromisw value: the_x-value^†
• Cooperative Fuzzy Games
• Income distribution and firm formation
• A Shapley function on a class of cooperative fuzzy games.

This page was built for publication: Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games.