An ESS maximum principle for matrix games.

DOI10.1006/tpbi.2000.1487zbMath1102.91303OpenAlexW2086295725WikidataQ52070039 ScholiaQ52070039MaRDI QIDQ1427669

Ross Cressman, Thomas L. Vincent

Publication date: 14 March 2004

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/tpbi.2000.1487

zbMATH Keywords

\(G\)-functionfitnessnonlinear matrix games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (7)

Evolutionary matrix games and optimization theory ⋮ Spatial reciprocity for discrete, continuous and mixed strategy setups ⋮ Combination of continuous and binary strategies enhances network reciprocity in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ THE G-FUNCTION METHOD FOR ANALYZING DARWINIAN DYNAMICS ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: Darwinian dynamics and the \(G\) function approach ⋮ Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space ⋮ Revisiting matrix games: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies

Cites Work

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• A theory for the evolutionary game
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolution via strategy dynamics
• Evolutionary stability in one-parameter models under weak selection
• Inclusive fitness arguments in genetic models of behaviour

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