A weak correspondence principle for models with complementarities.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00090-9zbMath1059.91060MaRDI QIDQ1428165

Federico Echenique

Publication date: 14 March 2004

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Monotone comparative staticsOut-of-equilibrium dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (3)

A strong correspondence principle for smooth, monotone environments ⋮ On the existence of stable equilibria in monotone games ⋮ On dynamic adjustment and comparative statics via the implicit function theorem

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle
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