Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation

DOI10.1214/ss/1049993199zbMath1062.91535OpenAlexW1974948933MaRDI QIDQ1429026

Jeff Gill, Jason Gainous

Publication date: 29 March 2004

Published in: Statistical Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1214/ss/1049993199

zbMATH Keywords

electionsspatial modelsparticipationrational choicecost-benefit modelsFlorida 2000 electionVoting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Estimating the Probability of Events That Have Never Occurred: When Is Your Vote Decisive?
• Expected Plurality Voting Equilibrium and Social Choice Functions
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