Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

DOI10.1007/s10058-003-0090-2zbMath1089.91015OpenAlexW2125435860MaRDI QIDQ1429395

Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Publication date: 18 May 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/390

zbMATH Keywords

sequential auctionsincreasing and decreasing expected pricesSynergies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (13)

Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions ⋮ Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement ⋮ Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers ⋮ Sequential auctions for stochastically equivalent complementary objects ⋮ Loss aversion in sequential auctions ⋮ The changing of common priors in sequential auctions ⋮ Auctions with synergy and resale ⋮ Uninformed bidding in sequential auctions ⋮ Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers ⋮ Solving for Best Responses and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games with Reinforcement Learning Methods ⋮ Auctions with an asking price ⋮ First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model ⋮ Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

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