He who must not be named

DOI10.1007/s10058-003-0094-yzbMath1089.91014OpenAlexW1552286184MaRDI QIDQ1429396

Philippe Février

Publication date: 18 May 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-003-0094-y

zbMATH Keywords

information disclosureSequential auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Uninformed bidding in sequential auctions ⋮ A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand ⋮ Signal jamming in a sequential auction ⋮ Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions ⋮ Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions

This page was built for publication: He who must not be named