Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9zbMath1064.91023OpenAlexW2017584471MaRDI QIDQ1429915

Tone Arnold, Andreas Blume

Publication date: 27 May 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00120-9

zbMATH Keywords

LanguageLearningGame theoryEvolutionCommunicationMeaningCheap talkInformation transmissionIncentive alignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES, Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria

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