Learning with perfect information.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00127-1zbMath1064.91018MaRDI QIDQ1429918

Ori Haimanko, Pradeep Dubey

Publication date: 27 May 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaConvergence in finite timeLearning in extensive form gamesObjective updatesPerfect informationSelf-confirming equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

An economist's perspective on multi-agent learning

Cites Work

• Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

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