The dimension for the European Union Council under the Nice rules.

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00903-7zbMath1056.90100MaRDI QIDQ1429939

Josep Freixas

Publication date: 27 May 2004

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

DimensionReal voting systemsSimple gamesWeighted majority games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90)

Related Items (15)

On the complexity of exchanging ⋮ A three-dimensional voting system in Hong Kong ⋮ A minimum dimensional class of simple games ⋮ Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU council: a challenge and new world record ⋮ On the use of binary decision diagrams for solving problems on simple games ⋮ Growth of dimension in complete simple games ⋮ On the generalized dimension and codimension of simple games ⋮ Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise ⋮ On the enumeration of some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions ⋮ Enumeration of weighted games with minimum and an analysis of voting power for bipartite complete games with minimum ⋮ Dimension of complete simple games with minimum ⋮ A power analysis of linear games with consensus ⋮ Simple games and weighted games: A theoretical and computational viewpoint ⋮ On the dimension of simple monotonic games ⋮ On the enumeration of Boolean functions with distinguished variables

Cites Work

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• Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power
• On defining sets of vertices of the hypercube by linear inequalities
• A power analysis of linear games with consensus
• A Characterization of Weighted Voting
• Partially Ordered Sets
• A note about games-composition dimension

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