The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
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Publication:1431786
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.004zbMath1076.91028OpenAlexW2144409094MaRDI QIDQ1431786
Publication date: 11 June 2004
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.004
Related Items (4)
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Signaling, screening, and core stability ⋮ Stability with one-sided incomplete information ⋮ Incomplete information, credibility and the core
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