Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00085-4zbMath1040.62058OpenAlexW2110135769MaRDI QIDQ1431787

Juan Perote-Peña, Javier Perote

Publication date: 11 June 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00085-4

zbMATH Keywords

regressionRobustSingle-peaked preferencesStrategy-proofnessData contamination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear regression; mixed models (62J05) Point estimation (62F10) Robustness and adaptive procedures (parametric inference) (62F35)

Related Items (6)

Strategic behavior in regressions: an experimental study ⋮ Incentive compatible regression learning ⋮ Algorithms for strategyproof classification ⋮ Statistical detection and classification of background risks affecting inputs and outputs ⋮ On incentive-compatible estimators ⋮ Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games

Cites Work

• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Least Median of Squares Regression
• Robust regression using repeated medians
• A Robust Method for Multiple Linear Regression
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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