An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.002zbMath1107.91074OpenAlexW2126603812MaRDI QIDQ1431789

Ruth Martínez, Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Jorge A. Oviedo

Publication date: 11 June 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

MatchingAlgorithmStabilitySubstitutable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites Work

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• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

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