On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role assignment procedures in evolutionary bargaining.

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.003zbMath1076.91008OpenAlexW2109836214MaRDI QIDQ1431792

Anders U. Poulsen

Publication date: 11 June 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

Evolutionary stabilityBargaining efficiencyRole assignmentSpitefulnessTie-breaking rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Tie-breaking in games of perfect information
• The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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