The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00035-9zbMath0966.91006MaRDI QIDQ1566511

Haruo Imai, Hannu Salonen

Publication date: 14 August 2001

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

perfect equilibriumrepresentative Nash solutiontwo sided bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (8)

One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities ⋮ Bargaining under monotonicity constraints ⋮ A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution ⋮ Sequential share bargaining ⋮ SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR A TWO PERSON BARGAINING PROBLEM WITH UNKNOWN PARAMETERS ⋮ One-dimensional bargaining ⋮ On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols ⋮ Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The unique perfect equilibrium of an \(n\)-person bargaining game
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• The \(n\)-person Nash bargaining solution with time preference
• Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences
• Power and Taxes
• Real Analysis and Probability
• Multilateral Bargaining

This page was built for publication: The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems