Maximum games, dominance solvability, and coordination

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0741zbMath1034.91003OpenAlexW2059562831MaRDI QIDQ1566894

Marco Mariotti

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0741

zbMATH Keywords

dominance-solvablemaximum games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (2)

When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? ⋮ Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms

Cites Work

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• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model

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