Implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms
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Publication:1566895
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0730zbMath1034.91007OpenAlexW2151007782MaRDI QIDQ1566895
David Wettstein, David Pérez-Castrillo
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0730
Related Items (6)
A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set ⋮ Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities ⋮ A noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set ⋮ Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value ⋮ The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games ⋮ Bargaining and bargaining sets.
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