Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2600zbMath1127.91332OpenAlexW2072493099MaRDI QIDQ1566907

Dan Levin, Colin M. Campbell

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2600

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (14)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions ⋮ Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner ⋮ The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ Auctions with an inexpert bidder ⋮ Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment ⋮ Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions ⋮ Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions ⋮ Private information revelation in common-value auctions

Cites Work

• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
• Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price

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