A note on the core of voting games

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00003-8zbMath0948.91005OpenAlexW2088908308WikidataQ56765179 ScholiaQ56765179MaRDI QIDQ1567185

Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, Boniface Mbih

Publication date: 27 November 2000

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00003-8

zbMATH Keywords

dominancecore stabilityvoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
• Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
• Acyclic social choice from finite sets
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules

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