New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1569155
DOI10.1016/S0096-3003(99)00008-9zbMath1042.91021MaRDI QIDQ1569155
Bunpei Nakano, Akira Yamazaki, Takehiro Inohara
Publication date: 25 June 2000
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (14)
A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation ⋮ A Model of Consensus and Consensus Building Within the Framework of Committees with Permissible Ranges of Decision Makers ⋮ Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making ⋮ Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games ⋮ Composite consensus-building process: permissible meeting analysis and compromise choice exploration ⋮ A new binary relation to compare viability of winning coalitions and its interrelationships to desirability relation and blockability relation ⋮ A characterization of completeness of blockability relations with respect to unanimity ⋮ Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation. ⋮ Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters. ⋮ Fundamentals of simple games from a viewpoint of blockability relations ⋮ A general model for voting systems with multiple alternatives ⋮ Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters. ⋮ Computation of several power indices by generating functions
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