On consistent coalitions in group decision making with flexible decision makers.

DOI10.1016/S0096-3003(98)10052-8zbMath1042.91009OpenAlexW2018976798WikidataQ126352577 ScholiaQ126352577MaRDI QIDQ1569174

Takehiro Inohara

Publication date: 25 June 2000

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0096-3003(98)10052-8

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsflexibilitygroup decision makingaccommodationconsistencecompromisesopinions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (2)

Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters. ⋮ Meetings in deadlock and decision makers with interperception.

Cites Work

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• On conditions for a meeting not to reach a recurrent argument
• Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference
• Integration of games and hypergames generated from a class of games

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