Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
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Publication:1572940
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2592zbMath0983.91033OpenAlexW2033059935MaRDI QIDQ1572940
Publication date: 23 April 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2592
Decision theory (91B06) Economics of information (91B44) General considerations in statistical decision theory (62C05)
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