Manipulation through bribes
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Publication:1572941
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2618zbMath0955.91031OpenAlexW2105478153MaRDI QIDQ1572941
Publication date: 4 March 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1207.pdf
Related Items (25)
Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies ⋮ Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions ⋮ Bribing and signaling in second price auctions ⋮ Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment ⋮ Joint misrepresentation with bribes ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification ⋮ Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money ⋮ Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results ⋮ Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation ⋮ Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences ⋮ No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods ⋮ Bribe-proof rules in the division problem ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification ⋮ Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity ⋮ Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains ⋮ Path auctions with multiple edge ownership ⋮ Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
Cites Work
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- The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games
- Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: The case of Groves mechanisms
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
- Incentives in Teams
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- A First Course in Optimization Theory
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
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