On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2617zbMath0955.91035OpenAlexW2027788801MaRDI QIDQ1572945

Anke S. Kessler

Publication date: 4 March 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2617

zbMATH Keywords

collusionmonitoring evidencethree-layer agency framework

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (4)

Monitoring the market or the salesperson? The value of information in a multilayer supply chain ⋮ Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations ⋮ GRANTING AN EXIT OPTION TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT

Cites Work

• Testing in Models of Asymmetric Information
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency

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