Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2623zbMath0957.91070OpenAlexW2000141013MaRDI QIDQ1572946

Holger M. Müller

Publication date: 25 September 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2623

zbMATH Keywords

Brownian motiondiscrete time

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (10)

Optimal risk-sharing with effort and project choice ⋮ Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model ⋮ Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems ⋮ Linear quadratic nonzero sum differential games with asymmetric information ⋮ A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem ⋮ Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents ⋮ Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal ⋮ Optimal contracts in continuous-time models ⋮ Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions ⋮ Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences

Cites Work

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• The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision

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