Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00040-2zbMath0952.91066MaRDI QIDQ1575091

Martin J. Osborne

Publication date: 25 September 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

entrypolitical competitionelectoral competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items

Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment ⋮ Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets ⋮ Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
• A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates