Choosing from a weighted tournament

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00042-6zbMath0966.91029OpenAlexW2214805875MaRDI QIDQ1575093

Philippe De Donder, Michel Truchon, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 25 September 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00042-6

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondenceset-theoretical comparisonweighted tournament

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters ⋮ Combinatorics of Election Scores ⋮ The flow network method ⋮ Is there a demand for income tax progressivity? ⋮ Optimal strategies for node selection games on oriented graphs: skew matrices and symmetric games ⋮ Distributive politics and electoral competition ⋮ The stability set as a social choice correspondence.

Cites Work

• Median linear orders: Heuristics and a branch and bound algorithm
• Choosing from a tournament
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• Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
• Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles
• Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
• Comparison functions and choice correspondences
• Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
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