Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00226-3zbMath0963.91039WikidataQ126388135 ScholiaQ126388135MaRDI QIDQ1575378

Dominique Lepelley, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 21 August 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

voting theoryCondorcet efficiencyBorda rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates ⋮ When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality ⋮ Effect of Thermal Stresses and Reduced Differential Transform on Bending of The Rectangular Plate ⋮ On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data

Cites Work

• The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
• Unnamed Item

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