Consistency in house allocation problems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1576474
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00038-5zbMath1145.91360OpenAlexW2065782527MaRDI QIDQ1576474
Publication date: 14 August 2000
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00038-5
Related Items (31)
House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence ⋮ Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems ⋮ Consistent house allocation ⋮ On the consistency of random serial dictatorship ⋮ Incompatibility between stability and consistency ⋮ Local and global consistency properties for student placement ⋮ The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? ⋮ Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources ⋮ Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments. ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices ⋮ Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange ⋮ Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses ⋮ Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents ⋮ Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange ⋮ Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation ⋮ Efficient assignment respecting priorities ⋮ On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems ⋮ Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization ⋮ Efficient priority rules ⋮ Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants ⋮ Heuristic allocation based on a dynamic programming state-space representation ⋮ Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
Cites Work
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Rationing a commodity along fixed paths
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- On cores and indivisibility
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
This page was built for publication: Consistency in house allocation problems
