A trade-off result for preference revelation
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Publication:1576476
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00037-3zbMath0964.91012OpenAlexW2094678959MaRDI QIDQ1576476
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Publication date: 14 August 2000
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00037-3
Related Items (4)
On the manipulation of social choice correspondences ⋮ Candidate stability and voting correspondences ⋮ Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
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