Mathematical modeling of China's state-owned enterprises' contract system

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00377-XzbMath0957.91071MaRDI QIDQ1577758

Feng Shan, Daxu Li

Publication date: 22 November 2000

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationdeveloping countriescompetionperfect informationChinese governmententerprise management systemoptimal incentive strategystate-owned enterprises' contract system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Cites Work

• An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability
• Contracting for Software Development
• Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm

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