The English auction with differentiated commodities
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Publication:1577929
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2580zbMath0962.91027OpenAlexW2023732846WikidataQ30050409 ScholiaQ30050409MaRDI QIDQ1577929
Publication date: 11 June 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/94336f75af42cd2b0c1b8e34a6c93e9aa192c76e
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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