Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2625zbMath0972.91064OpenAlexW2570852591MaRDI QIDQ1577932

Ben Lockwood

Publication date: 27 August 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269249/files/twoway1.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

externalitiesprincipal-agent problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations

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