On market games when agents cannot be in two places at once

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0745zbMath1016.91042OpenAlexW2011812291MaRDI QIDQ1577955

Cheng-Zhong Qin, Rod Garratt

Publication date: 27 August 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0745

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional gamecapital goodduration of the market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Multicoalitional solutions ⋮ A market interpretation of the proportional extended core ⋮ Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games ⋮ Equal treatment without large numbers ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games

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