Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
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Publication:1577956
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0746zbMath1065.91519OpenAlexW1976431442MaRDI QIDQ1577956
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0746
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