Selective acceptance and inefficiency in a two-issue complete information bargaining game
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Publication:1577961
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0742zbMath0967.91003OpenAlexW1969846346MaRDI QIDQ1577961
Publication date: 2 May 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0742
subgame perfect equilibriainefficient equilibriaopposing valuationspackage acceptanceselective acceptancetwo issue bargaining game
Related Items (3)
A logic-based axiomatic model of bargaining ⋮ Representation in multi-issue delegated bargaining ⋮ The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements
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