Selective acceptance and inefficiency in a two-issue complete information bargaining game

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0742zbMath0967.91003OpenAlexW1969846346MaRDI QIDQ1577961

Catherine J. Weinberger

Publication date: 2 May 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0742

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriainefficient equilibriaopposing valuationspackage acceptanceselective acceptancetwo issue bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (3)

A logic-based axiomatic model of bargaining ⋮ Representation in multi-issue delegated bargaining ⋮ The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty
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• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information

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