Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0743zbMath1065.91544OpenAlexW2049042512MaRDI QIDQ1577962

Antonio Romero-Medina, José Alcalde

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5588

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (26)

Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem ⋮ The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Decentralized job matching ⋮ The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules ⋮ Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games ⋮ In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability ⋮ Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium ⋮ Decentralized matching: the role of commitment ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability ⋮ Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab ⋮ The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets ⋮ A simple selling and buying procedure

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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