Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0750zbMath1065.91522OpenAlexW2079350058MaRDI QIDQ1577963

Rajiv Sethi, Efe A. Ok, Levent Koçkesen

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0750

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Individual preferences (91B08)

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Cites Work

• Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
• Theories of imperfectly competitive markets
• Negatively interdependent preferences