Signaling bargaining power: Strategic delay versus restricted offers

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DOI10.1007/s001990050336zbMath0957.91033OpenAlexW2091291986MaRDI QIDQ1580795

Publication date: 14 September 2000

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/25031

zbMATH Keywords

delay sequential equilibrium buyer-seller bargaining game first-round separating equilibrium restrictive agenda

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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