Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
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Publication:1581192
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2605zbMath0967.91007OpenAlexW2020226291MaRDI QIDQ1581192
Rann Smorodinsky, Nabil I. Al-Najjar
Publication date: 14 January 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1174.pdf
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Cites Work
- Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
- A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote
- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- When are nonanonymous players negligible?
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Large nonanonymous repeated games
