Adaptive learning and equilibrium selection in experimental coordination games: An ARCH(1) approach
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Publication:1581905
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0751zbMath0956.91028OpenAlexW2080041143MaRDI QIDQ1581905
Publication date: 18 March 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/89690d753ae77a19061fd431b081ae2b51b6cb28
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